[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[S. 495 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]
105th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 495
_______________________________________________________________________
AN ACT
To provide criminal and civil penalties for the unlawful acquisition,
transfer, or use of any chemical weapon or biological weapon, and to
reduce the threat of acts of terrorism or armed aggression involving
the use of any such weapon against the United States, its citizens, or
Armed Forces, or those of any allied country, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Chemical and
Biological Weapons Threat Reduction Act of 1997''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings.
Sec. 3. Policy.
Sec. 4. Definitions.
TITLE I--PENALTIES FOR UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION
OF THE UNITED STATES
Subtitle A--Criminal and Civil Penalties
Sec. 101. Criminal and civil provisions.
Subtitle B--Revocations of Export Privileges
Sec. 111. Revocations of export privileges.
TITLE II--FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DEFENSE-RELATED PROVISIONS
Sec. 201. Sanctions for use of chemical or biological weapons.
Sec. 202. Continuation and enhancement of multilateral control regimes.
Sec. 203. Criteria for United States assistance to Russia relating to
the elimination of chemical and biological
weapons.
Sec. 204. Report on the state of chemical and biological weapons
proliferation.
Sec. 205. International conference to strengthen the 1925 Geneva
Protocol.
Sec. 206. Restriction on use of funds for the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Sec. 207. Enhancements to robust chemical and biological defenses.
Sec. 208. Negative security assurances.
Sec. 209. Riot control agents.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that--
(1) the United States eliminated its stockpile of
biological weapons pursuant to the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention and has pledged to destroy its entire inventory of
chemical weapons by 2004, independent of the Chemical Weapons
Convention entering into force;
(2) the use of chemical or biological weapons in
contravention of international law is abhorrent and should
trigger immediate and effective sanctions;
(3) United Nations Security Council Resolution 620, adopted
on August 26, 1988, states the intention of the Security
Council to consider immediately ``appropriate and effective''
sanctions against any nation using chemical and biological
weapons in violation of international law;
(4) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade recognizes
that national security concerns may serve as legitimate grounds
for limiting trade; title XXI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade states that ``nothing in this Agreement shall
be construed . . . to prevent any contracting party from taking
any action which it considers necessary for the protection of
its essential security interests. . .'';
(5) on September 30, 1993, the President declared by
Executive Order No. 12868 a national emergency to deal with
``the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States''
posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons, and of the means for delivering such weapons;
(6) Russia has not implemented the 1990 United States-
Russian Bilateral Agreement on Destruction and Non-Production
of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the
Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, known as
the ``BDA'', nor has the United States and Russia resolved, to
the satisfaction of the United States, the outstanding
compliance issues under the Memorandum of Understanding Between
the United States of America and the Government of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification
Experiment and Data Exchange Related To Prohibition on Chemical
Weapons, known as the ``1989 Wyoming MOU'';
(7) the Intelligence Community has stated that a number of
countries, among them China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, Syria, and Russia, possess chemical and biological
weapons and the means to deliver them;
(8) four countries in the Middle East--Iran, Iraq, Libya,
and Syria--have, as a national policy, supported international
terrorism;
(9) chemical and biological weapons have been used by
states in the past for intimidation and military aggression,
most recently during the Iran-Iraq war and by Iraq against its
Kurdish minority;
(10) the grave new threat of chemical and biological
terrorism has been demonstrated by the 1995 nerve gas attack on
the Tokyo subway by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo;
(11) the urgent need to improve domestic preparedness to
protect against chemical and biological threats was underscored
by enactment of the 1997 Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act;
(12) the Department of Defense, in light of growing
chemical and biological threats in regions of key concern,
including Northeast Asia, and the Middle East, has stated that
United States forces must be properly trained and equipped for
all missions, including those in which opponents might threaten
use of chemical or biological weapons; and
(13) Australia Group controls on the exports of chemical
and biological agents, and related equipment, and the Missile
Technology Control Regime, together provide an indispensable
foundation for international and national efforts to curb the
spread of chemical and biological weapons, and their delivery
means.
SEC. 3. POLICY.
It should be the policy of the United States to take all
appropriate measures to--
(1) prevent and deter the threat or use of chemical and
biological weapons against the citizens, Armed Forces, and
territory of the United States and its allies, and to protect
against, and manage the consequences of, such use should it
occur;
(2) discourage the proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons, their means of delivery, and related equipment,
material, and technology;
(3) prohibit within the United States the development,
production, acquisition, stockpiling, possession, and transfer
to third parties of chemical or biological weapons, their
precursors and related technology; and
(4) impose unilateral sanctions, and seek immediately
international sanctions, against any nation using chemical and
biological weapons in violation of international law.
SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Australia group.--The term ``Australia Group'' refers
to the informal forum of countries, formed in 1984 and chaired
by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical
and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing national
export controls on precursor chemicals for chemical weapons,
biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use equipment, sharing
information on target countries, and seeking other ways to curb
the use of chemical weapons and biological weapons.
(2) Biological weapon.--The term ``biological weapon''
means the following, together or separately:
(A) Any micro-organism (including bacteria,
viruses, fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, or
infectious substance, or any naturally occurring, bio-
engineered or synthesized component of any such micro-
organism, pathogen, or infectious substance, whatever
its origin or method of production, capable of
causing--
(i) death, disease, or other biological
malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or
another living organism;
(ii) deterioration of food, water,
equipment, supplies, or materials of any kind;
or
(iii) deleterious alteration of the
environment.
(B) Any munition or device specifically designed to
cause death or other harm through the release,
dissemination, or impact of the toxic or poisonous
properties of those biological weapons specified in
subparagraph (A).
(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use
directly in connection with the employment of munitions
or devices specified in subparagraph (B).
(D) Any living organism specifically designed to
carry a biological weapon specified in subparagraph (A)
to a host.
(3) Chemical weapon.--The term ``chemical weapon'' means
the following, together or separately:
(A) Any of the following chemical agents: tabun,
Sarin, Soman, GF, VX, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard,
phosgene oxime, lewisite, phenyldichloroarsine,
ethyldichloroarsine, methyldichloroarsine, phosgene,
diphosgene, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and
arsine.
(B) Any of the 54 chemicals other than a riot
control agent that is controlled by the Australia Group
as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
(C) Any other chemical agent that may be developed
if the use of the agent would be intended to produce an
effect consistent with that of a chemical agent or
other chemical described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
(D) Any munition or device specifically designed to
cause death or other harm through the release,
dissemination, or impact of the toxic or poisonous
properties of a chemical weapon specified in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
(E) Any equipment specifically designed for use
directly in connection with the employment of munitions
or devices specified in subparagraph (D).
(4) Knowingly.--The term ``knowingly'' is used within the
meaning of ``knowing'' as that term is defined in section 104
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-
2).
(5) National of the united states.--The term ``national of
the United States'' has the same meaning given such term in
section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
(6) Person.--The term ``person'' means any individual,
corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other legal
entity.
(7) Riot control agent.--The term ``riot control agent''
means any substance, including diphenylchloroarsine,
diphenylcyanoarsine, adamsite, chloroacetophenone,
chloropicrin, bromobenzyl cyanide, 0-chlorobenzylidene
malononitrile, or 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate, that is designed
or used to produce rapidly in humans any nonlethal sensory
irritation or disabling physical effect that disappears within
a short time following termination of exposure.
(8) United states.--The term ``United States'' means the
several States of the United States, the District of Columbia,
and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the
United States and includes all places under the jurisdiction or
control of the United States, including--
(A) any of the places within the provisions of
paragraph (41) of section 40102 of title 49, United
States Code;
(B) any civil aircraft or public aircraft of the
United States, as such terms are defined in paragraphs
(18) and (36) of section 40102 of title 49, United
States Code; and
(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term
is defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug
Enforcement Act, as amended (46 U.S.C., App. sec.
1903(b)).
TITLE I--PENALTIES FOR UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION
OF THE UNITED STATES
Subtitle A--Criminal and Civil Penalties
SEC. 101. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROVISIONS.
(a) In General.--Part I of title 18, United States Code, is amended
by inserting after chapter 11A the following new chapter:
``CHAPTER 11B--CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
``Sec.
``229. Prohibited activities.
``229A. Penalties.
``229B. Criminal forfeitures; destruction of weapons.
``229C. Other prohibitions.
``229D. Injunctions.
``229E. Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition in
certain emergencies.
``229F. Definitions.
``Sec. 229. Prohibited activities.
``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--Except as provided in subsections (b) and
(c), it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly--
``(1) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer,
directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own,
possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon or any
biological weapon; or
``(2) to assist or induce, in any way, any person to
violate paragraph (1), or to attempt or conspire to violate
paragraph (1).
``(b) Exempted Conduct.--Subsection (a) does not apply to conduct
that satisfies the following requirements of both paragraphs (1) and
(2):
``(1) Lawful purpose.--The chemical weapon or biological
weapon is intended for any of the following purposes:
``(A) Peaceful purposes.--Any peaceful purpose
related to an industrial, agricultural, research,
medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity.
``(B) Protective purposes.--Any purpose directly
related to protection against a chemical or biological
weapon.
``(C) Unrelated military purposes.--Any military
purpose of the United States that is not connected with
the use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon or
that is not dependent on the use of the toxic or
poisonous properties of the chemical weapon or
biological weapon to cause death or other harm.
``(D) Law enforcement purposes.--Any law
enforcement purpose, including any domestic riot
control purpose.
``(E) Individual self-defense purposes.--Any
individual self-defense purpose involving a pepper
spray or chemical mace.
``(2) Limitation on type and quantity.--
``(A) In general.--The type and quantity of the
chemical weapon or biological weapon is strictly
limited to the type and quantity that can be justified
for the purpose intended under paragraph (1).
``(B) Excessive quantities per person.--The
requirement of this paragraph is not satisfied if the
quantity per person at any given time is, under the
circumstances, inconsistent with the purpose intended
under paragraph (1).
``(c) Exempted Agencies and Persons.--
``(1) In general.--Subsection (a) does not apply to the
retention, ownership, possession, transfer, or receipt of a
chemical weapon or a biological weapon by a department, agency,
or other entity of the United States, or by a person described
in paragraph (2), pending destruction of the weapon.
``(2) Exempted persons.--A person referred to in paragraph
(1) is--
``(A) a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States or any other person that is authorized by law or
by an appropriate officer of the United States to
retain, own, possess, transfer, or receive the chemical
or biological weapon; or
``(B) in an emergency situation, any other person
if the person is attempting to destroy or seize the
weapon or if the person is a victim of the use of the
weapon.
``(d) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a) is within
the jurisdiction of the United States if the prohibited conduct--
``(1) takes place in the United States;
``(2) takes place outside of the United States and is
committed by a national of the United States;
``(3) is committed against a national of the United States
while the national is outside the United States; or
``(4) is committed against any property that is owned,
leased, or used by the United States or by any department or
agency of the United States, whether the property is within or
outside the United States.
``Sec. 229A. Penalties
``(a) Criminal Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--Any person who violates section 229 of
this title shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for
any term of years, or both.
``(2) Death penalty.--Any person who violates section 229
of this title and by whose action the death of another person
is the result shall be punished by death or imprisoned for
life.
``(b) Civil Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--The Attorney General may bring a civil
action in the appropriate United States district court against
any person who violates section 229 of this title and, upon
proof of such violation by a preponderance of the evidence,
such person shall be subject to pay a civil penalty in an
amount not to exceed $100,000 for each such violation.
``(2) Relation to other proceedings.--The imposition of a
civil penalty under this subsection does not preclude any other
criminal or civil statutory, common law, or administrative
remedy, which is available by law to the United States or any
other person.
``(c) Reimbursement of Costs.--The court shall order any person
convicted of an offense under subsection (a) to reimburse the United
States for any expenses incurred by the United States incident to the
seizure, storage, handling, transportation, and destruction or other
disposition of any property that was seized in connection with an
investigation of the commission of the offense by that person. A person
ordered to reimburse the United States for expenses under this
subsection shall be jointly and severally liable for such expenses with
each other person, if any, who is ordered under this subsection to
reimburse the United States for the same expenses.
``Sec. 229B. Criminal forfeitures; destruction of weapons
``(a) Property Subject to Criminal Forfeiture.--Any person
convicted under section 229A(a) shall forfeit to the United States
irrespective of any provision of State law--
``(1) any property, real or personal, involved in the
offense, including any chemical weapon or biological weapon;
``(2) any property constituting, or derived from, and
proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the
result of such violation; and
``(3) any of the person's property used, or intended to be
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the
commission of, such violation.
The court, in imposing sentence on such person, shall order, in
addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to section 229A(a),
that the person forfeit to the United States all property described in
this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by section
229A(a), a defendant who derived profits or other proceeds from an
offense may be fined not more than twice the gross profits or other
proceeds.
``(b) Procedures.--Property subject to forfeiture under this
section, any seizure and disposition thereof, and any administrative or
judicial proceeding in relation thereto, shall be governed by
subsections (b) through (p) of section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), except that
any reference under those subsections to--
``(1) `this subchapter or subchapter II' shall be deemed to
be a reference to section 229A(a); and
``(2) `subsection (a)' shall be deemed to be a reference to
subsection (a) of this section.
``(c) Destruction or Other Disposition.--The Attorney General shall
provide for the destruction or other appropriate disposition of any
chemical or biological weapon seized and forfeited pursuant to this
section.
``(d) Assistance.--The Attorney General may request the head of any
agency of the United States to assist in the handling, storage,
transportation, or destruction of property seized under this section.
``Sec. 229C. Other prohibitions
``(a) In General.--Whoever knowingly uses riot control agents as an
act of terrorism, or knowingly assists any person to do so, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned for a term of not more than 10
years, or both.
``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by this section is within
the jurisdiction of the United States if the prohibited conduct--
``(1) takes place in the United States;
``(2) takes place outside of the United States and is
committed by a national of the United States;
``(3) is committed against a national of the United States
while the national is outside the United States; or
``(4) is committed against any property that is owned,
leased, or used by the United States or by any department or
agency of the United States, whether the property is within or
outside the United States.
``Sec. 229D. Injunctions
``The United States may obtain in a civil action an injunction
against--
``(1) the conduct prohibited under section 229 or 229C of
this title; or
``(2) the preparation or solicitation to engage in conduct
prohibited under section 229 or 229C of this title.
``Sec. 229E. Requests for military assistance to enforce prohibition in
certain emergencies
``The Attorney General may request the Secretary of Defense to
provide assistance under section 382 of title 10 in support of
Department of Justice activities relating to the enforcement of section
229 of this title in an emergency situation involving a biological
weapon or chemical weapon. The authority to make such a request may be
exercised by another official of the Department of Justice in
accordance with section 382(f)(2) of title 10.
``Sec. 229F. Definitions
``In this chapter:
``(1) Australia group.--The term `Australia Group' refers
to the informal forum of countries, formed in 1984 and chaired
by Australia, whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical
and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing national
export controls on precursor chemicals for chemical weapons,
biological weapons pathogens, and dual-use equipment, sharing
information on target countries, and seeking other ways to curb
the use of chemical and biological weapons.
``(2) Biological weapon.--The term `biological weapon'
means the following, together or separately:
``(A) Any micro-organism (including bacteria,
viruses, fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, or
infectious substance, or any naturally occurring, bio-
engineered or synthesized component of any such micro-
organism, pathogen, or infectious substance, whatever
its origin or method of production, capable of
causing--
``(i) death, disease, or other biological
malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or
another living organism;
``(ii) deterioration of food, water,
equipment, supplies, or materials of any kind;
or
``(iii) deleterious alteration of the
environment.
``(B) Any munition or device specifically designed
to cause death or other harm through the release,
dissemination, or impact of the toxic or poisonous
properties of those biological weapons specified in
subparagraph (A).
``(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use
directly in connection with the employment of munitions
or devices specified in subparagraph (B).
``(D) Any living organism specifically designed to
carry a biological weapon specified in subparagraph (A)
to a host.
``(3) Chemical weapon.--The term `chemical weapon' means
the following, together or separately:
``(A) Any of the following chemical agents: tabun,
Sarin, Soman, GF, VX, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard,
phosgene oxime, lewisite, phenyldichloroarsine,
ethyldichloroarsine, methyldichloroarsine, phosgene,
diphosgene, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and
arsine.
``(B) Any of the 54 chemicals, other than a riot
control agent, controlled by the Australia Group as of
the date of the enactment of this Act.
``(C) Any other chemical agent that may be
developed if the use of the agent would be intended to
produce an effect consistent with that of a chemical
agent or other chemical described in subparagraph (A)
or (B).
``(D) Any munition or device specifically designed
to cause death or other harm through the release,
dissemination, or impact of the toxic or poisonous
properties of a chemical weapon specified in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
``(E) Any equipment specifically designed for use
directly in connection with the employment of munitions
or devices specified in subparagraph (D).
``(4) Knowingly.--The term `knowingly' is used within the
meaning of `knowing' as that term is defined in section 104 of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (15 U.S.C. 78dd-2).
``(5) National of the united states.--The term `national of
the United States' has the same meaning given such term in
section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101(a)(22)).
``(6) Person.--The term `person' means any individual,
corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other legal
entity.
``(7) Riot control agent.--The term `riot control agent'
means any substance, including diphenylchloroarsine,
diphenylcyanoarsine, adamsite, chloroacetophenone,
chloropicrin, bromobenzyl cyanide, 0-chlorobenzylidene
malononitrile, or 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate that is designed or
used to produce rapidly in humans any nonlethal sensory
irritation or disabling physical effect that disappears within
a short time following termination of exposure.
``(8) Terrorism.--The term `terrorism' means activities
that--
``(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of
the United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction
of the United States or of any State; and
``(B) appear to be intended--
``(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population;
``(ii) to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or
``(iii) to affect the conduct of a
government by assassination or kidnapping.
``(9) United states.--The term `United States' means the
several States of the United States, the District of Columbia,
and the commonwealths, territories, and possessions of the
United States and includes all places under the jurisdiction or
control of the United States, including--
``(A) any of the places within the provisions of
section 40102(41) of title 49, United States Code;
``(B) any civil aircraft or public aircraft of the
United States, as such terms are defined in paragraphs
(16) and (37), respectively, of section 40102 of title
49, United States Code; and
``(C) any vessel of the United States, as such term
is defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Weapons of mass destruction.--Section 2332a of title
18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking ``Sec. 2332a. Use of weapons of
mass destruction'' and inserting ``Sec. 2332a. Use of
certain weapons of mass destruction'';
(B) in subsection (a), by striking ``, including
any biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms
are defined in section 178)'' and inserting ``other
than a chemical weapon or biological weapon (as those
terms are defined in section 229F)''; and
(C) in subsection (b), by inserting ``(other than a
chemical weapon or biological weapon (as those terms
are defined in section 229F))'' after ``weapon of mass
destruction''.
(2) Table of chapters.--The table of chapters for part I of
title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking the item relating to chapter 10;
and
(B) by inserting after the item for chapter 11A the
following new item:
``11B. Chemical and Biological Weapons...................... 229''.
(c) Repeals.--The following provisions of law are repealed:
(1) Chapter 10 of title 18, United States Code, relating to
biological weapons.
(2) Section 2332c of title 18, United States Code, relating
to chemical weapons.
(3) In the table of sections for chapter 113B of title 18,
United States Code, the item relating to section 2332c.
Subtitle B--Revocations of Export Privileges
SEC. 111. REVOCATIONS OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES.
If the President determines, after notice and an opportunity for a
hearing in accordance with section 554 of title 5, United States Code,
that any person within the United States, or any national of the United
States located outside the United States, has committed any violation
of section 229 of title 18, United States Code, the President may issue
an order for the suspension or revocation of the authority of the
person to export from the United States any goods or technology (as
such terms are defined in section 16 of the Export Administration Act
of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2415)).
TITLE II--FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DEFENSE-RELATED PROVISIONS
SEC. 201. SANCTIONS FOR USE OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
Title III of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (title III of Public Law 102-182) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating section 309 as section 312; and
(2) by striking sections 306 through 308 and inserting the
following new sections:
``SEC. 306. PURPOSE.
``The purpose of sections 306 through 311 is--
``(1) to provide for the imposition of sanctions against
any foreign government--
``(A) that has used chemical or biological weapons
in violation of international law; or
``(B) that has used chemical or biological weapons
against its own nationals; and
``(2) to ensure that the victims of the use of chemical or
biological weapons shall be compensated and awarded punitive
damages, as may be determined.
``SEC. 307. PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.
``(a) Bilateral Sanctions.--Except as provided in subsections (c)
and (d), the President shall, after the consultation with Congress,
impose the sanctions described in subsections (a) and (b) of section
308 if the President determines that any foreign government--
``(1) has used a chemical weapon or biological weapon in
violation of international law; or
``(2) has used a chemical weapon or biological weapon
against its own nationals.
``(b) Multilateral Sanctions.--The sanctions imposed pursuant to
subsection (a) are in addition to any multilateral sanction or measure
that may be otherwise agreed.
``(c) Presidential Waiver.--The President may waive the application
of any of the sanctions imposed pursuant to subsection (a) if the
President determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate that implementing such measures would have a substantial
negative impact upon the supreme national interests of the United
States.
``(d) Sanctions Not Applied to Certain Existing Contracts.--A
sanction described in section 308 shall not apply to any activity
pursuant to a contract or international agreement entered into before
the date of the Presidential determination under subsection (a) if the
President determines that performance of the activity would reduce the
potential for the use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon by the
sanctioned country.
``SEC. 308. MANDATORY SANCTIONS.
``(a) Minimum Number of Sanctions.--After consultation with
Congress and making a determination under section 307 with respect to
the actions of a foreign government, the President shall impose not
less than 5 of the following sanctions against that government for a
period of three years:
``(1) Foreign assistance.--The United States Government
shall terminate assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, except for urgent humanitarian assistance and food or
other agricultural commodities or products.
``(2) Arms sales.--The United States Government shall not
sell any item on the United States Munitions List and shall
terminate sales to that country under this Act of any defense
articles, defense services, or design and construction
services. Licenses shall not be issued for the export to the
sanctioned country of any item on the United States Munitions
List, or for commercial satellites.
``(3) Arms sale financing.--The United States Government
shall terminate all foreign military financing under this Act.
``(4) Denial of united states government credit or other
financial assistance.--The United States Government shall deny
any credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by
any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States
Government, including the Export-Import Bank of the United
States.
``(5) Export controls.--The authorities of section 6 of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 shall be used to prohibit the
export of any goods or technology on that part of the control
list established under section 5(c)(1) of that Act, and all
other goods and technology under this Act (excluding food and
other agricultural commodities and products) as the President
may determine to be appropriate.
``(6) Multilateral bank assistance.--The United States
shall oppose, in accordance with section 701 of the
International Financial Institutions Act, the extension of any
loan or financial or technical assistance by international
financial institutions.
``(7) Bank loans.--The United States Government shall
prohibit any United States bank from making any loan or
providing any credit, including to any agency or
instrumentality of the government, except for loans or credits
for the purpose of purchasing food or other agricultural
commodities or products.
``(8) Aviation rights.--
``(A) In general.--
``(i) Notification.--The President is
authorized to notify the government of a
country with respect to which the President has
made a determination pursuant to section 307(a)
of his intention to suspend the authority of
foreign air carriers owned or controlled by the
government of that country to engage in foreign
air transportation to or from the United
States.
``(ii) Suspension of aviation rights.--
Within 10 days after the date of notification
of a government under subclause (I), the
Secretary of Transportation shall take all
steps necessary to suspend at the earliest
possible date the authority of any foreign air
carrier owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by that government to engage in
foreign air transportation to or from the
United States, notwithstanding any agreement
relating to air services.
``(B) Termination of air service agreements.--
``(i) In general.--The President may direct
the Secretary of State to terminate any air
service agreement between the United States and
a country with respect to which the President
has made a determination pursuant to section
307(a), in accordance with the provisions of
that agreement.
``(ii) Termination of aviation rights.--
Upon termination of an agreement under this
clause, the Secretary of Transportation shall
take such steps as may be necessary to revoke
at the earliest possible date the right of any
foreign air carrier owned, or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by the government of
that country to engage in foreign air
transportation to or from the United States.
``(C) Exception.--The Secretary of Transportation
may provide for such exceptions from the sanction
contained in subparagraph (A) as the Secretary
considers necessary to provide for emergencies in which
the safety of an aircraft or its crew or passengers is
threatened.
``(D) Definitions.--For purposes of this paragraph,
the terms `aircraft', `air transportation', and
`foreign air carrier' have the meanings given those
terms in section 40102 of title 49, United States Code.
``(9) Diplomatic relations.--The President shall use his
constitutional authorities to downgrade or suspend diplomatic
privileges between the United States and that country.
``(b) Blocking of Assets.--Upon making a determination under
section 307, the President shall take all steps necessary to block any
transactions in any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States in which the foreign country or any national thereof has any
interest whatsoever, for the purpose of compensating the victims of the
chemical or biological weapons use and for punitive damages as may be
assessed.
``(c) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in this section limits the
authority of the President to impose a sanction that is not specified
in this section.
``SEC. 309. REMOVAL OF SANCTIONS.
``(a) Certification Requirement.--The President shall remove the
sanctions imposed with respect to a foreign government pursuant to this
section if the President determines and so certifies to the Congress,
after the end of the three-year period beginning on the date on which
sanctions were initially imposed on that country pursuant to section
307, that--
``(1) the government of that country has provided reliable
assurances that it will not use any chemical weapon or
biological weapon in violation of international law and will
not use any chemical weapon or biological weapon against its
own nationals;
``(2) the government of the country is willing to accept
onsite inspections or other reliable measures to verify that
the government is not making preparations to use any chemical
weapon or biological weapon in violation of international law
or to use any chemical weapon or biological weapon against its
own nationals; and
``(3) the government of the country is making restitution
to those affected by any use of any chemical weapon or
biological weapon in violation of international law or against
its own nationals.
``(b) Reasons for Determination.--The certification made under this
subsection shall set forth the reasons supporting such determination in
each particular case.
``(c) Effective Date.--The certification made under this subsection
shall take effect on the date on which the certification is received by
the Congress.
``SEC. 310. NOTIFICATIONS AND REPORTS OF CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
USE AND APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS.
``(a) Notification.--Not later than 30 days after persuasive
information becomes available to the executive branch of Government
indicating the substantial possibility of the use of chemical or
biological weapons by any person or government, the President shall so
notify Congress in writing.
``(b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after making a notification
under subsection (a), the President shall submit a report to Congress
that contains--
``(1) an assessment by the President in both classified and
unclassified form of the circumstances of the suspected use of
chemical or biological weapons, including any determination by
the President made under section 307 with respect to a foreign
government; and
``(2) a description of the actions the President intends to
take pursuant to the assessment, including the imposition of
any sanctions or other measures pursuant to section 307.
``(c) Progress Report.--Not later than 60 days after submission of
a report under subsection (b), the President shall submit a progress
report to Congress describing actions undertaken by the President under
sections 306 through 311, including the imposition of unilateral and
multilateral sanctions and other punitive measures, in response to the
use of any chemical weapon or biological weapon described in the
report.
``(d) Recipients of Notifications and Reports.--Any notification or
report required by this section shall be submitted to the following:
``(1) The Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.
``(2) The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
``(3) The Committee on International Relations and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
``SEC. 311. DEFINITIONS.
``In sections 306 through 310:
``(1) Biological weapon.--The term `biological weapon'
means the following, together or separately:
``(A) Any micro-organism (including bacteria,
viruses, fungi, rickettsiae or protozoa), pathogen, or
infectious substance, or any naturally occurring, bio-
engineered or synthesized component of any such micro-
organism, pathogen, or infectious substance, whatever
its origin or method of production, capable of
causing--
``(i) death, disease, or other biological
malfunction in a human, an animal, a plant, or
another living organism;
``(ii) deterioration of food, water,
equipment, supplies, or materials of any kind;
or
``(iii) deleterious alteration of the
environment.
``(B) Any munition or device specifically designed
to cause death or other harm through the release,
dissemination, or impact of the toxic or poisonous
properties of those biological weapons specified in
subparagraph (A).
``(C) Any equipment specifically designed for use
directly in connection with the employment of munitions
or devices specified in subparagraph (B).
``(D) Any living organism specifically designed to
carry a biological weapon specified in subparagraph (A)
to a host.
``(2) Chemical weapon.--The term `chemical weapon' means
the following, together or separately:
``(A) Any of the following chemical agents: tabun,
Sarin, Soman, GF, VX, sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard,
phosgene oxime, lewisite, phenyldichloroarsine,
ethyldichloroarsine, methyldichloroarsine, phosgene,
diphosgene, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and
arsine.
``(B) Any of the 54 chemicals, other than a riot
control agent, controlled by the Australia Group as of
the date of the enactment of this Act.
``(C) Any other chemical agent that may be
developed if the use of the agent would be intended to
produce an effect consistent with that of a chemical
agent or other chemical described in subparagraph (A)
or (B).
``(D) Any munition or device specifically designed
to cause death or other harm through the release,
dissemination, or impact of the toxic or poisonous
properties of a chemical weapon specified in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
``(E) Any equipment specifically designed for use
directly in connection with the employment of munitions
or devices specified in subparagraph (D).
``(3) Person.--The term `person' means any individual,
corporation, partnership, firm, association, or other legal
entity.''.
SEC. 202. CONTINUATION AND ENHANCEMENT OF MULTILATERAL CONTROL REGIMES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that any
collapse of the informal forum of states known as the ``Australia
Group'', either through changes in membership or lack of compliance
with common export controls, or any substantial weakening of common
Australia Group export controls and nonproliferation measures in force
as of the date of enactment of this Act, would seriously undermine
international and national efforts to curb the spread of chemical and
biological weapons and related equipment.
(b) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States--
(1) to continue close cooperation with other countries in
the Australia Group in support of its current efforts and in
devising additional means to monitor and control the supply of
chemicals and biological agents applicable to weapons
production;
(2) to maintain an equivalent or more comprehensive level
of control over the export of toxic chemicals and their
precursors, dual-use processing equipment, human, animal and
plant pathogens and toxins with potential biological weapons
application, and dual-use biological equipment, as that
afforded by the Australia Group as of the date of enactment of
this Act;
(3) to block any effort by any Australia Group member to
achieve Australia Group consensus on any action that would
substantially weaken existing common Australia Group export
controls and nonproliferation measures or otherwise undermine
the effectiveness of the Australia Group; and
(4) to work closely with other countries also capable of
supplying equipment, materials, and technology with particular
applicability to the production of chemical or biological
weapons in order to devise and harmonize the most effective
national controls possible on the transfer of such materials,
equipment, and technology.
(c) Certification.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall
determine and certify to Congress whether--
(1) the Australia Group continues to maintain an equivalent
or more comprehensive level of control over the export of toxic
chemicals and their precursors, dual-use processing equipment,
human, animal, and plant pathogens and toxins with potential
biological weapons application, and dual-use biological
equipment, as that afforded by the Australia Group as of the
date of the last certification under this subsection, or, in
the case of the first certification, the level of control
maintained as of the date of enactment of this Act; and
(2) the Australia Group remains a viable mechanism for
curtailing the spread of chemical and biological weapons-
related materials and technology, and whether the effectiveness
of the Australia Group has been undermined by changes in
membership, lack of compliance with common export controls, or
any weakening of common controls and measures that are in
effect as of the date of enactment of this Act.
(d) Consultations.--
(1) In general.--The President shall consult periodically,
but not less frequently than twice a year, with the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives, on
Australia Group export controls and nonproliferation measures.
(2) Resulting from presidential certification.--If the
President certifies that either of the conditions in subsection
(c) are not met, the President shall consult within 60 days of
such certification with the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives on steps the United States should take
to maintain effective international controls on chemical and
biological weapons-related materials and technology.
SEC. 203. CRITERIA FOR UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA RELATING TO
THE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, United
States assistance described in subsection (d) may not be obligated or
expended unless a certification by the President is in effect under
subsection (b) or subsection (c).
(b) Certification With Respect to Russian Chemical and Biological
Program.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall certify that--
(1) Russia is making reasonable progress toward the
implementation of the Bilateral Destruction Agreement;
(2) the United States and Russia have made substantial
progress toward resolution, to the satisfaction of the United
States, of outstanding compliance issues under the Wyoming
Memorandum of Understanding and the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement;
(3) Russia has fully and accurately declared all
information regarding its unitary and binary chemical weapons,
chemical weapons production facilities, and other facilities
associated with the development of chemical weapons; and
(4) Russia is in compliance with its obligations under the
Biological Weapons Convention.
(c) Alternative Certification.--A certification under this
subsection is a certification by the President that the President is
unable to make a certification under subsection (b).
(d) Period of Effectiveness of Certifications.--Each certification
made under this section shall not be effective for a period of more
than one year.
(e) United States Assistance Covered.--United States assistance
described in this subsection is United States assistance out of funds
made available for fiscal year 1998 or any fiscal year thereafter that
is provided with respect to Russia only for the purposes of--
(1) facilitating the transport, storage, safeguarding, and
elimination of any chemical weapon or biological weapon or its
delivery vehicle;
(2) planning, designing, or construction of any destruction
facility for a chemical weapon or biological weapon; or
(3) supporting any international science and technology
center.
(f) Definitions.--
(1) Bilateral destruction agreement.--The term ``Bilateral
Destruction Agreement'' means Agreement Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on Destruction and Nonproduction of Chemical Weapons and on
Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning
Chemical Weapons, signed on June 1, 1990.
(2) Biological weapons convention.--The term ``Biological
Weapons Convention'' means the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, done
at Washington, London, and Moscow on April 10, 1972.
(3) Wyoming memorandum of understanding.--The term
``Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding'' means the Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and
Data Exchange Related to Prohibition on Chemical Weapons,
signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on September 23, 1989.
(4) United states assistance.--The term ``United States
assistance'' has the meaning given the term in section
481(e)(4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2291(e)(4)).
SEC. 204. REPORT ON THE STATE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION.
Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act,
and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report containing
the following:
(1) Proliferation by foreign countries.--A description of
any efforts by China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and Syria, and any country that has,
during the five years prior to submission of the report, used
any chemical weapon or biological weapon or attempted to
acquire the material and technology to produce and deliver
chemical or biological agents, together with an assessment of
the present and future capability of the country to produce and
deliver such agents.
(2) Foreign persons assisting in proliferation.--An
identification of--
(A) those persons that in the past have assisted
the government of any country described in paragraph
(1) in that effort; and
(B) those persons that continue to assist the
government of the country described in paragraph (1) in
that effort as of the date of the report.
(3) Third country assistance in proliferation.--An
assessment of whether and to what degree other countries have
assisted any government or country described in paragraph (1)
in its effort to acquire the material and technology described
in that paragraph.
(4) Intelligence information on third country assistance.--
A description of any confirmed or credible intelligence or
other information that any country has assisted the government
of any country described in paragraph (1) in that effort,
either directly or by facilitating the activities of the
persons identified in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3)
or had knowledge of the activities of the persons identified in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3), but took no action to
halt or discourage such activities.
(5) Intelligence information on subnational groups.--A
description of any confirmed or credible intelligence or other
information of the development, production, stockpiling, or
use, of any chemical weapon or biological weapon by subnational
groups, including any terrorist or paramilitary organization.
(6) Funding priorities for detection and monitoring
capabilities.--An identification of the priorities of the
executive branch of Government for the development of new
resources relating to detection and monitoring capabilities
with respect to chemical weapons and biological weapons.
SEC. 205. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO STRENGTHEN THE 1925 GENEVA
PROTOCOL.
(a) Definition.--In this section, the term ``1925 Geneva Protocol''
means the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods
of Warfare, done at Geneva June 17, 1925 (26 UST 71; TIAS 8061).
(b) Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United States--
(1) to work to obtain multilateral agreement to effective,
international enforcement mechanisms to existing international
agreements that prohibit the use of chemical and biological
weapons, to which the United States is a state party; and
(2) pursuant to paragraph (1), to work to obtain
multilateral agreement regarding the collective imposition of
sanctions and other measures described in title III of the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991, as amended by this Act.
(c) Responsibility.--The Secretary of State shall, as a priority
matter, take steps necessary to achieve United States objectives, as
set forth in this section.
(d) Sense of the Senate.--The Senate urges and directs the
Secretary of State to work to convene an international negotiating
forum for the purpose of concluding an international agreement on
enforcement of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
(e) Allocation of Funds.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated to the Department of State for fiscal year 1998 under the
appropriations account entitled ``International Conferences and
Contingencies'', $5,000,000 shall be available only for payment of
salaries and expenses in connection with efforts of the Secretary of
State to conclude an international agreement described in subsection
(d).
SEC. 206. RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE
PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
(a) Prohibition.--None of the funds appropriated pursuant to any
provision of law, including previously appropriated funds, may be
available to make any voluntary or assessed contribution to the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or to reimburse
any account for the transfer of in-kind items to the Organization,
unless or until the Convention on the Prohibition of Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, opened for signature at Paris January 13, 1993, enters
into force for the United States.
(b) Statutory Construction.--Nothing in subsection (a) may be
construed to apply to the Preliminary Commission for the establishment
of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
SEC. 207. ENHANCEMENTS TO ROBUST CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the threats posed by chemical and biological weapons to
United States Armed Forces deployed in regions of concern will
continue to grow and will undermine United States strategies
for the projection of United States military power and the
forward deployment of United States Armed Forces;
(2) the use of chemical or biological weapons will be a
likely condition of future conflicts in regions of concern;
(3) it is essential for the United States and key regional
allies of the United States to preserve and further develop
robust chemical and biological defenses;
(4) the United States Armed Forces, both active and
nonactive duty, are inadequately equipped, organized, trained,
and exercised for operations in chemically and biologically
contaminated environments;
(5) the lack of readiness stems from a deemphasis by the
executive branch of Government and the United States Armed
Forces on chemical and biological defense;
(6) the armed forces of key regional allies and likely
coalition partners, as well as civilians necessary to support
United States military operations, are inadequately prepared
and equipped to carry out essential missions in chemically and
biologically contaminated environments;
(7) congressional direction contained in the 1997 Defense
Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act is intended to lead to
enhanced domestic preparedness to protect against the use of
chemical and biological weapons; and
(8) the United States Armed Forces should place increased
emphasis on potential threats to deployed United States Armed
Forces and, in particular, should make countering the use of
chemical and biological weapons an organizing principle for
United States defense strategy and for the development of force
structure, doctrine, planning, training, and exercising
policies of the United States Armed Forces.
(b) Defense Readiness Training.--The Secretary of Defense shall
take those actions that are necessary to ensure that the United States
Armed Forces are capable of carrying out required military missions in
United States regional contingency plans despite the threat or use of
chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the Secretary of Defense
shall ensure that the United States Armed Forces are effectively
equipped, organized, trained, and exercised (including at the large
unit and theater level) to conduct operations in chemically and
biologically contaminated environments that are critical to the success
of United States military plans in regional conflicts, including--
(1) deployment, logistics, and reinforcement operations at
key ports and airfields;
(2) sustained combat aircraft sortie generation at critical
regional airbases; and
(3) ground force maneuvers of large units and divisions.
(c) Discussions With Allied Countries on Readiness.--
(1) High-priority joint responsibility of secretaries of
defense and state.--The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary
of State shall give a high priority to discussions with key
regional allies and likely regional coalition partners,
including those countries where the United States currently
deploys forces, where United States forces would likely operate
during regional conflicts, or which would provide civilians
necessary to support United States military operations, to
determine what steps are necessary to ensure that allied and
coalition forces and other critical civilians are adequately
equipped and prepared to operate in chemically and biologically
contaminated environments.
(2) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State shall jointly submit to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a
report describing--
(A) the results of the discussions held under
paragraph (1) and plans for future discussions;
(B) the measures agreed to improve the preparedness
of foreign armed forces and civilians; and
(C) any proposals for increased military
assistance, including assistance provided through--
(i) the sale of defense articles and
defense services under the Arms Export Control
Act;
(ii) the Foreign Military Financing program
under section 23 of that Act; and
(iii) chapter 5 of part II of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to
international military education and training).
(d) United States Army Chemical School.--
(1) Command of school.--The Secretary of Defense shall take
those actions that are necessary to ensure that the United
States Army Chemical School remains under the oversight of a
general officer of the United States Army.
(2) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(A) the transfer, consolidation, and reorganization
of the United States Army Chemical School should not
disrupt or diminish the training and readiness of the
United States Armed Forces to fight in a chemical-
biological warfare environment; and
(B) the Army should continue to operate the
Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort McClellan
until such time as the replacement facility at Fort
Leonard Wood is functional.
(e) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, and on January 1 every year thereafter,
the President shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations, the Committee on National Security,
and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives on previous, current, and planned chemical and
biological weapons defense activities of the United States
Armed Forces.
(2) Content of report.--Each report required by paragraph
(1) shall include the following information for the previous
fiscal year and for the next three fiscal years:
(A) Enhancement of defense and readiness.--Proposed
solutions to each of the deficiencies in chemical and
biological warfare defenses identified in the March
1996 General Accounting Office Report, titled
``Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains
Insufficient to Resolve Continuing Problems'', and
steps being taken pursuant to subsection (b) to ensure
that the United States Armed Forces are capable of
conducting required military operations to ensure the
success of United States regional contingency plans
despite the threat or use of chemical or biological
weapons.
(B) Priorities.--An identification of priorities of
the executive branch of Government in the development
of both active and passive defenses against the use of
chemical and biological weapons.
(C) RDT&E and procurement of defenses.--A detailed
summary of all budget activities associated with the
research, development, testing, and evaluation, and
procurement of chemical and biological defenses, set
forth by fiscal year, program, department, and agency.
(D) Vaccine production and stocks.--A detailed
assessment of current and projected vaccine production
capabilities and vaccine stocks, including progress in
researching and developing a multivalent vaccine.
(E) Decontamination of infrastructure and
installations.--A detailed assessment of procedures and
capabilities necessary to protect and decontaminate
infrastructure and installations that support the
ability of the United States to project power through
the use of its Armed Forces, including progress in
developing a nonaqueous chemical decontamination
capability.
(F) Protective gear.--A description of the progress
made in procuring lightweight personal protective gear
and steps being taken to ensure that programmed
procurement quantities are sufficient to replace
expiring battledress overgarments and chemical
protective overgarments to maintain required wartime
inventory levels.
(G) Detection and identification capabilities.--A
description of the progress made in developing long-
range standoff detection and identification
capabilities and other battlefield surveillance
capabilities for biological and chemical weapons,
including progress on developing a multichemical agent
detector, unmanned aerial vehicles, and unmanned ground
sensors.
(H) Theater missile defenses.--A description of the
progress made in developing and deploying layered
theater missile defenses for deployed United States
Armed Forces which will provide greater geographic
coverage against current and expected ballistic missile
threats and will assist the mitigation of chemical and
biological contamination through higher altitude
intercepts and boost-phase intercepts.
(I) Training and readiness.--An assessment of the
training and readiness of the United States Armed
Forces to operate in chemically and biologically
contaminated environments and actions taken to sustain
training and readiness, including at national combat
training centers.
(J) Military exercises.--A description of the
progress made in incorporating consideration about the
threat or use of chemical and biological weapons into
service and joint exercises as well as simulations,
models, and wargames, together with the conclusions
drawn from these efforts about the United States
capability to carry out required missions, including
with coalition partners, in military contingencies.
(K) Military doctrine.--A description of the
progress made in developing and implementing service
and joint doctrine for combat and noncombat operations
involving adversaries armed with chemical or biological
weapons, including efforts to update the range of
service and joint doctrine to better address the wide
range of military activities, including deployment,
reinforcement, and logistics operations in support of
combat operations, and for the conduct of such
operations in concert with coalition forces.
(L) Defense of civilian population.--A description
of the progress made in resolving issues relating to
the protection of United States population centers from
chemical and biological attack and from the
consequences of such an attack, including plans for
inoculation of populations, consequence management, and
progress made in developing and deploying effective
cruise missile defenses and a national ballistic
missile defense.
SEC. 208. NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that in order
to achieve an effective deterrence against attacks of the United States
and United States Armed Forces by chemical weapons, the President
should reevaluate the extension of negative security assurances by the
United States to nonnuclear-weapon states in the context of the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the Committee on
Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a report, both in
classified and unclassified forms, setting forth--
(1) the findings of a detailed review of United States
policy on negative security assurances as a deterrence
strategy; and
(2) a determination by the President of the appropriate
range of nuclear and conventional responses to the use of
chemical or biological weapons against the United States Armed
Forces, United States citizens, allies, and third parties.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Negative security assurances.--The term ``negative
security assurances'' means the assurances provided by the
United States to nonnuclear-weapon states in the context of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483)
that the United States will forswear the use of certain weapons
unless the United States is attacked by that nonnuclear-weapon
state in alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.
(2) Nonnuclear-weapon states.--The term ``nonnuclear-weapon
states'' means states that are not nuclear-weapon states, as
defined in Article IX(3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July
1, 1968 (21 UST 483).
SEC. 209. RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.
(a) Prohibition.--The President shall not issue any order or
directive that diminishes, abridges, or alters the right of the United
States to use riot control agents--
(1) in any circumstance not involving international armed
conflict; or
(2) in a defensive military mode to save lives in an
international armed conflict, as provided for in Executive
Order No. 11850 of April 9, 1975.
(b) Circumstances Not Involving International Armed Conflict.--The
use of riot control agents under subsection (a)(1) includes the use of
such agents in--
(1) peacekeeping or peace support operations;
(2) humanitarian or disaster relief operations;
(3) noncombatant evacuation operations;
(4) counterterrorist operations and the rescue of hostages;
and
(5) law enforcement operations and other internal
conflicts.
(c) Defensive Military Mode.--The use of riot control agents under
subsection (a)(2) may include the use of such agents--
(1) in areas under direct and distinct United States
military control, including the use of such agents for the
purposes of controlling rioting or escaping enemy prisoners of
war;
(2) to protect personnel or material from civil
disturbances, terrorists, and paramilitary organizations;
(3) to minimize casualties during rescue missions of downed
air crews and passengers, prisoners of war, or hostages;
(4) in situations where combatants and noncombatants are
intermingled; and
(5) in support of base defense, rear area operations,
noncombatant evacuation operations, and operations to protect
or recover nuclear weapons.
(d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
international law permits the United States to use herbicides, under
regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation
within United States bases and installations or around their immediate
defensive perimeters.
(e) Authority of the President.--The President shall take all
necessary measures, and prescribe such rules and regulations as may be
necessary, to ensure that the policy contained in this section is
observed by the Armed Forces of the United States.
Passed the Senate April 17, 1997.
Attest:
Secretary.
105th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 495
_______________________________________________________________________
AN ACT
To provide criminal and civil penalties for the unlawful acquisition,
transfer, or use of any chemical weapon or biological weapon, and to
reduce the threat of acts of terrorism or armed aggression involving
the use of any such weapon against the United States, its citizens, or
Armed Forces, or those of any allied country, and for other purposes.