Question 3874 — defense

Summary

Ms. Gisèle Lelouis questions the Minister of the Armed Forces about the flaws concerning multi-role armored vehicles (VBMR). Since the publication of the White Paper on Defense and National Security in 2013 and as part of the Scorpion program aimed at modernizing land weapons, France has replaced its numerous armored forward vehicles (VAB) in favor of the VBMR. This replacement, without any real increase in armored personnel, already posed the question of a dispersion of models for the industry when France formerly had only one, avoiding a "logistical nightmare", while it is known that high intensity also depends on the mass (because it takes numbers to control an area, which an army of samples, even the most sophisticated, cannot do) with "cheap" models quick to produce, excellent all-terrain capabilities, etc., even if the essential projection capacity of “SNCF templates” is ensured. These latest multi-role armored vehicles, embodied by the Griffon and the Serval, are real technological laboratories, with great capacities, demonstrating the know-how of French industry. Costing therefore double that of a VAB, they are becoming the backbone of the French army, despite certain delivery delays. Of the 1 872 VBMR Griffon planned in 2019 for 2030, 575 were delivered in 2024 and 208 VBMR-L Serval out of 978. These armored vehicles thus ensure the functions of ballistic protection, transport, communication and observation in the field. However, during the joint cyber defense training (DEFNET) organized from March 18 to 29, 2024, a soldier managed to disrupt a Griffon multi-role armored vehicle. Indeed, at Using a telemeter developed by the army, the soldier managed to disrupt the vehicle's computer system, forcing it to brake and temporarily putting it out of action. Even more, damage caused to the vehicle by the device can compromise the communication network. The impact of this incident should not be overlooked. Indeed, the Griffon multi-role armored vehicle is available in several models. He therefore plays roles key in many sectors such as troop transport (Griffon VTT), artillery observation (Griffon VOA), command (Griffon VPC) and medical operations (Griffon SAN), etc. The incapacitation of these vehicles following a cyber attack makes them an easy target for the adversary and the resulting compromise of the communications network greatly weakens the integrity of the entire communications network of the French army. This event also highlights the informational scope of such attacks. Indeed, the dissemination of images of vehicles immobilized following cyberattacks within the media space can undermine the confidence that the French have, including those in the military, in the effectiveness of the army. Thus, the French army must be able to respond to these possible broadcasts and compensate for its current vulnerability to tactical cyberattacks. It is also possible to question the global scope of this vulnerability to cyberattacks. Does this concern all types of multi-role armored vehicles? Does the EBRC Jaguar, of which 60 examples have been received out of the 300 planned for 2030, have the same cyber vulnerability? The latter already had a defect with its T40 turret, which houses two MMP missiles under armor, in a retractable launcher, with two other munitions available in the hold, forcing one of the three crew members who lost to the short straw to expose themselves to reload, the cyber threat adding a possible new defect. The all-technological politico-industrial strategy requires adaptability and necessary adjustments, unfortunately costly to maintain effective operability of the armies. Thus, to the extent that this vulnerability would extend to all VBMR models or armored vehicles connected to the network, this event raises the question of the vulnerability and the place of computer systems within the armed forces. The protection and integrity of these systems are an absolute necessity to ensure the proper functioning of the Army. So, should we review the place and importance of computer systems within vehicles? armored, or strengthen the security of their computer systems? If this is the case, the MP asks the Minister what he intends to do to compensate for the vulnerability of VBMR computer systems to possible cyberattacks, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the French army. Furthermore, certain questions arise about the armored vehicles “replaced” by the VBMR, namely the VAB. The Minister announced the sending to abroad of “hundreds of second-hand French armored vehicles”. She asks him if it would not also be wise to keep some in stock to "mass", compensate for possible failures of the VBMR, or even to equip the basic reserve units of the Army with them in view of the growth projects.

Machine translation from French. The official text remains authoritative.

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