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9673
Question 9673 — terrorism
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Summary
The number of radicalized prisoners has been decreasing for 2 years (from 1,662 on June 1, 2017 to 1,439 on June 1, 2019); the prison administration has professionalized its detection, evaluation and intelligence capabilities, making it possible to have a less subjective risk-based approach. The care of radicalized people in detention and the preparation of their release is a major concern of the Government which adopted the February 23, 2018, the national plan for the prevention of radicalization (PNPR), then, on July 13, 2018, the action plan against terrorism (PACT). These two plans provide for strong actions to respond to legitimate fears linked to the release from detention of individuals radicalized or convicted of acts of terrorism. Thus, action 6 of the action plan against terrorism (PACT) provides for the creation of a permanent unit within the coordination and anti-terrorism unit (UCLAT) of the Ministry of the Interior. This permanent unit is responsible for anticipating the treatment, by the intelligence services, of individuals accused of or convicted of terrorism offenses, upon their release from prison. This unit, in which the central prison intelligence office (BCRP) of the prison administration directorate participates, has been operating since the month of July 2018. Monthly meetings in which the Ministry of Justice participates are also organized in order to ensure that each individual leaving prison is effectively taken into account. Action 8 of the PACT also strengthens control and monitoring measures for those convicted of terrorism, by providing for the creation, within the Paris High Court, of a third position of enforcement judge. anti-terrorism penalties. The national plan for the prevention of radicalization (PNPR) also provided, in its actions 55 and following, measures aimed at improving the monitoring of radicalized populations. In an open environment, the management of the prison administration experimented, for two years from October 2016, with an intensive care system for radicalized people (RIVE) in Ile-de-France. The objective was to implement place, in addition to the care by a penitentiary integration and probation service which remains the holder of the judicial mandate, reinforced and multidisciplinary monitoring of people subject to proceedings or serving a sentence in connection with a terrorist offense. The evaluation of this system highlighted the effectiveness of intensive support in the process of disengagement from violent ideology. Also, has the national plan for the prevention of radicalization extended and renovated this system by providing to its extent 58 the creation of three new centers intended for the individualized care of people radicalized or in the process of radicalization, and placed under the supervision of justice. These centers are based on the Parisian experiment, the results of which have made it possible to change the methods of care, in particular towards a more great modularity of follow-ups (from 3 hours to 20 hours/week), carrying out a diagnosis or even the possibility of diffuse accommodation. The Paris center, which opened on October 4, 2018, continued its activity by monitoring people previously followed by RIVE. The Marseille center, opened on October 29, 2018, is carrying out its first monitoring and continues its gradual ramp-up. The Lyon center opened in July and that of Lille will begin its activity in the fall. During this period, the prison administration management will have 110 places dedicated to the intensive care of people monitored in an open environment for acts of a terrorist or radicalized nature. In a closed environment, since 2015, the management of the prison administration has experimented with specific methods of caring for radicalized prisoners, terrorist or common law, which have been widespread throughout the territory. These actions are today developed through several coherent systems established in particular by the PNPR: the prison administration has developed radicalization detection grids and defined programs for the prevention of violent radicalization (49 PPRVs were conducted in 2018, and the objective pursued in 2019 is the expansion of these programs to all establishments actually hosting detainees involved in terrorism cases) and created radicalization assessment (QER) and radicalized persons (QPR) areas. The assessment of radicalized prisoners and their management is indeed a priority. To this end, in addition to the three radicalization evaluation districts (QER) in the Paris region, two new QERs were opened on May 14, 2018 and January 7, 2019 at the Vendin-le-Vieil penitentiary center. In order to continue the extension of its evaluation capacities, the management of the prison administration will open 2 additional QERs in 2019, bringing the number of districts of this type to 7. These openings allow beyond the evaluation of terrorist detainees to proceed to the evaluation of legal detainees radicalized people. The penitentiary experience of violent radicalization also encourages the administration to no longer subordinate the conditions of the evaluation to the sole determinant of the criminal category: the legal distinctions between accused/convicted or terrorists/radicalized under common law limit an approach based on risks, which is nevertheless at the heart of the treatment strategy, after evaluation. The DAP therefore retains a prioritization of prisoners to be assessed which takes into account dangerousness criteria and the expected release date, in order, for example, to avoid as much as possible that a highly radicalized prisoner is released without having been assessed in prison. Finally, the prison intelligence service joined the second circle of the French intelligence community on February 1, 2017 and actively contributes to policies to fight against terrorist threat. Pursuing in particular the aim of preventing terrorism (L.811-3 4° CSI), it has extensive investigative powers, in particular the possible use of intelligence collection technologies. The staff of the central prison intelligence office has quadrupled over the past two years, while a territorial prison intelligence network has been developed. Today, this service whose progress and mastery are recognized by partner services, collaborates closely with them during and after the period of incarceration. Thus, the Government has adopted a global strategy to face the challenge of violent radicalization: the detection and evaluation of populations are at the heart, with the aim of dispersing them into suitable establishments and neighborhoods and individualizing the care of radicalized prisoners, whether they are terrorist or common law. The Government also organizes an effective dialogue between the various authorities contributing to the detection and obstruction of individuals carrying a threat of violent radicalization. As such, the Ministry of the Interior issued, on November 13, 2018, an instruction specifying the framework and modalities of the exchange of information between the representative of the State in the department and the mayors regarding individuals likely to be radicalized. This instruction is intended to be soon supplemented by a dispatch from the Ministry of Justice regarding the role of the judicial authority in the mechanism for transmitting information between the prefect and the mayor. This instruction and this dispatch recall the possibility of exchanging confidential nominative information within the framework of restricted groups of councils security and delinquency prevention premises (CLSPD). This collaboration between institutional partners constitutes one of the most effective responses to the security challenge posed by radicalized and/or terrorist individuals.
Machine translation from French. The official text remains authoritative.
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- Official source: https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/questions/QANR5L15QE9673
- Open data entity: https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/QANR5L15QE9673