Grid Cyber Security Act

Summary

Grid Cyber Security Act - Amends the Federal Power Act to direct the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to: (1) determine whether certain reliability standards are adequate to protect critical electric infrastructure from cyber security vulnerabilities, and (2) order the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) to submit a proposed reliability standard or a modification to a reliability standard that will provide adequate protection of critical electric infrastructure from cyber security vulnerabilities if FERC determines that such reliability standards are inadequate to do so. Authorizes the Secretary of Energy to: (1) require persons subject to FERC jurisdiction to take immediate action that will best avert or mitigate the cyber security threat if necessary to protect critical electric infrastructure, and (2) coordinate with Canadian and Mexican officials responsible for the protection of cyber security of the interconnected North American electricity grid. Directs the Secretary of Defense (DOD) to prepare a comprehensive plan that identifies the emergency measures or actions to protect the reliability of the electric power supply of the national defense facilities located in Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam. Includes in the bulk-power system any facilities used for the local distribution of electric energy that FERC determines to be critical electric infrastructure. Grants the ERO limited enforcement authority with respect to a facility used in the local distribution of electric energy if the FERC determines that its incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, or national public health or safety. Authorizes FERC, if immediate action is necessary to protect critical electric infrastructure for a cyber security vulnerability, to require the ERO to develop, issue, and make effective immediately a temporary emergency order addressing the vulnerability. Directs the Secretary of Energy to assess: (1) the susceptibility of critical electric infrastructure to electromagnetic pulse events and geomagnetic disturbances, and (2) whether and to what extent infrastructure affecting the transmission of electric power in interstate commerce should be hardened against such events and disturbances.

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Documents

4 official files

• Placed on Calendar Senate (text)

  Placed on Calendar Senate · EN · 11 July 2011

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• Placed on Calendar Senate (PDF)

  Placed on Calendar Senate · EN · 11 July 2011

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• Reported to Senate without amendment

  summary · EN · 11 July 2011

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• Introduced in Senate

  summary · EN · 11 July 2011

  Open at official source

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