France · Question · Question écrite
15357
Question 15357 — elections and referendums
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26 May 2026
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26 May 2026
Summary
Mr. Hadrien Clouet draws the attention of the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs to the restricted nature of the list of polling stations opened by embassies and consular posts for the election of advisors to French people living abroad residing in Germany. While 31 polling stations had been opened on May 6, 2024 for the elections of representatives to the European Parliament, there are now only 12 offices which are scheduled to open for the vote on May 31, 2026, for an electorate of 112,000 registered voters. For example, the constituency of Stuttgart saw its voting sites go from five (Stuttgart CG, Offenburg, Fribourg, Karlsruhe, Tübingen) to just three (Stuttgart CG, Fribourg, Karlruhe). Likewise, in Berlin, the offices formerly distributed between the Embassy and the French Lycée are drastically reduced from eight to three. Furthermore, the Leipzig office was closed. This approach is not in conformity with the principle of equality before the vote in that, on the one hand, the selection of the voting sites maintained seems to free itself from the needs of geographical accessibility essential to democratic life, in that, on the other hand, by multiplying the distances to travel to reach the ballot box, this organization encourages the unequal investment of citizens in the electoral game, for a vote which already showed only 2.13% physical participation in 2021, in that, finally, this drastic reduction in the proximity offer de facto imposes the use of online voting as the only alternative. Furthermore, the MP is surprised: closed offices are systematically the most favorable to the left, creating suspicion about the reasons for selection. However, if law no. 2013-659 of July 22 2013 relating to the representation of French people established outside France provides for the possibility of voting by electronic mail, it is conditioned by means of hardware and software likely to respect the secrecy of the vote and the sincerity of the ballot. But the risks of opaque and unverifiable internet voting are very real. Among these, the risks linked to the digital divide. People who do not have access to the internet or who do not have a digital qualification cannot participate in the same way as others. Internet voting also presents risks of manipulation and the possibility of votes being forced, bought or diverted. This is a major concern and the Government that is instigating such a system must put in place an infrastructure that allows it to guarantee the integrity of the process. In its report of Tuesday May 19, 2026, the CNIL reported a 10% increase in data leaks in 2025, half of which was the result of hacking. The recent computer attacks suffered by ANTS, the Ministry of the Economy, France Travail, Parcoursup and six government ministries demonstrate the fragility of digital infrastructures in the face of intrusions and raise questions about the capacity of State services to protect its citizens in the context of this election. It is also its technical opacity which contrasts with the standards in force in other countries such as Estonia, which makes the source code of its digital polling station public to citizens and international observers and offers the possibility of changing one's vote in order to guarantee the final integrity of the vote. Furthermore, research on online voting during the 2014 French consular elections demonstrates that voting by The internet has tended to favor right-wing lists to the detriment of left-wing forces, thus disrupting the fairness of electoral competition. He therefore asks him what reasons motivate such a lack of resources for these elections and how he intends to guarantee respect for the principle of equality before the vote. He wishes to know what urgent measures will be taken to reopen closed offices and increase physical sites in order to to limit voters' journeys and ensure the sincerity of the vote.
Machine translation from French. The official text remains authoritative.
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- Official source: https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/17/questions/QANR5L17QE15357
- Open data entity: https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/opendata/QANR5L17QE15357