Question 17526 — space and space policy

Summary

Mr. Édouard Bénard draws the attention of the Minister of Higher Education, Research and Space to the Bromo merger project. On October 23, 2025, the Airbus, Leonardo and Thales groups announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding aimed at grouping their main space activities within a new joint venture called Bromo, officially with the aim of strengthening the technological sovereignty of the European Union in a space sector facing rapid change, marked by the emergence of new international competitors and increasing security requirements. Presented as a European response to SpaceX's Starlink satellite network, the Bromo project intends to bring together, within the same company, the entities Thales Alenia Space, Thales SESO, the Space Systems and Space Digital activities of Airbus Defense and Space, as well as the Telespazio joint venture. This project raises many questions about its merits. The main international competitor targeted by the Bromo project, namely Starlink, was built around vertical consolidation making it possible to control the entire industrial chain (equipment, assembly, firing, operations, sale of services), thus avoiding stacking of margins. Conversely, the Bromo project consists above all in a horizontal consolidation of infrastructure manufacturers. As presented by the management of the various groups involved, it aims to avoid competition between the European manufacturers concerned, in particular with clients, mainly institutional (ESA, CNES, Defense, etc.), to eliminate duplication in research and development as well as infrastructures (clean rooms, testing facilities and integration), while limiting the negotiating capacities of their subcontractors in order to increase the level of profitability of the merged companies. The financial objective of the Bromo project, fully assumed, is to achieve an EBIT of 14% in eight years, almost triple the usual profitability of the space sector. This is based on a cost synergy strategy, synonymous with “optimization” of the industrial footprint, removal of the aforementioned duplication, or even outsourcing and relocations, including outside Europe. 25,000 employees spread across around thirty European sites would be directly affected by this merger project, including more than 4,500 in France out of the 9,000 employees in the Thales group. However, Thales, with the Airbus Defense and Space group, has already cut 12% of its French workforce, or 1,300 jobs since 2024. This social bill, already heavy, has resulted in a loss of skills and attractiveness of professions. It was accompanied, in 2025 at Thales Alenia Space and Airbus Defense and Space, by a lack of salary increases, even though the order books were full. Delivery postponements even had to be negotiated, due to the inability to honor current contracts, while profits were increasing. Presented as a tool to ensure the competitiveness of European companies in the space sector, the Bromo project struggles to convince on this point given the low research and development expenditure of the three groups combined, which has fallen to less than 3% of turnover, well below the average of competitors. This situation would be likely to get even worse with the job cuts plans in place or in the future. come, if the Bromo project were to materialize in its current form. Likewise, the absence of other credible European competitors, particularly to respond to institutional orders in a context of increased spending, particularly in defense, due to the merger, would no longer encourage the new group to invest in order to stand out. This already happened during the creation of ArianeGroup, where the priority given to profitability of the privatized company resulted in investment delays and loss of skills linked to job cuts (the workforce fell from 12,000 to 8,000 employees). Financial choices which had the consequence of delaying the arrival of Ariane 6 by several years and depriving Europe of launchers, making it dependent on SpaceX for its access to space, while it was previously the leader in the commercial launcher market. According to Euroconsult, an analysis and consulting company specializing in the satellite and space market, the commercial segment of geostationary satellites, which was on average 12 satellites per year over the period 2013-2022, would stand at 14 satellites per year over the period 2023-2032, with 80% of these geostationary satellites of the SDS type (satellites reconfigurable in flight by software). To date, only two companies in the world sell this type of satellite: Thales Alenia Space and Airbus Defense and Space. The merger of the space activities of these two companies would create a situation of private monopoly detrimental to private and institutional satellite operators, the new entity probably having the desire to increase its margins. This monopoly situation on SDS satellites could lead European operators to resort to international competition, particularly American competition, or encourage the emergence of new European competitors driven by public orders from their Government, as the German Government is already doing with the companies OHB-System and Rheinmetall, associated with Vantor. Far from strengthening the industrial capacities of the European space sector, the Bromo project, as it is defined, brings with it a reduction in capacities intervention by public authorities, in particular the French State, in defining the strategic orientations of the new entity, likely to undermine the industrial, military and technological sovereignty of France. Currently, the French State is the largest shareholder of the Thales group, with 36% of voting rights, which allows it to influence space industrial policy in line with its needs, in particular those of defense established by the military programming law, or those of the recently created space command center. If the French State also holds 11% of the capital of Airbus SE, the merger of the space activities of the three groups concerned would dilute the participation of the French State to around ten percent of the voting rights within the new entity. In fact, the French Government would not no longer able to guide the space policy of the new society, thus losing an essential lever to ensure the sovereignty of its defense. Likewise, the question of the stability of the shareholding of the new entity arises with particular acuteness: what will happen if one of the three initial shareholders decides, in a few years, to withdraw and sell part or all of its shares, in particular for the benefit of a non-European group, thus exposing essential industrial and technological capabilities, contrary to the strategic interests of the country? If this essentially capital-intensive project were to succeed, it appears essential that the French State can ensure that it has a specific action type mechanism or a related legal device, allowing the Government to oppose a decision which would undermine the strategic interests of the country, such as critical technologies, developments in industrial sites or changes in the capital of the new entity. Likewise, it would be appropriate to ensure that elected employee representatives have representation with voting rights on the board of directors of the new entity, to represent the voice of those who build the satellites. It also appears essential to Mr. Member to retain the geographic return rules, which currently prevail in public procurement in the European space sector. These provide the various participating States with jobs based on their commitments within the projects they finance. Indeed, removing this rule would directly threaten smaller sites across Europe. Communist deputies, like the trade union organizations of French companies in the space sector, consider that another path is possible: that of cooperation and strategic planning around strong companies and public agencies, like what prevailed at the launch of the first European space cooperations. Cooperations that prioritize research and meeting the needs of populations over the race for excess profits, which tends towards development ecologically and humanly irresponsible activities (space tourism, data center projects deployed in Earth orbit, etc.). Space activities involve, in many respects, the sovereignty of the country. Also, the State must retain the capacity to drive, guide and protect France's strategic interests. Consequently, he asks him to kindly communicate to him the position of the French Government on the project of Bromo merger as well as the measures it intends to take to preserve the superior interests of the State within this highly strategic sector of activity.

Machine translation from French. The official text remains authoritative.

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1. 4 August 2026

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• Édouard Bénard · auteur

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